The petition has been revised and revamped, please sign and then send the link to your family, friends, and fellow Guardsmen and women! We need to BLOW THE WHISTLE!
http://www.petition2congress.com/16851
View the petition activity report, by State, to see how many people in your area are raising the red flag: http://www.petition2congress.com/16851/senate-bill-2410-allows-48-guard-apache-helicopters-to-be-taken-i/act/
Watch the latest video from CSIS re: A State’s Perspective on ARI as it relates to AH-64 Apaches in the National Guard, and to see what some of the senior Guardsmen across our Nation have to say on this topic.
http://csis.org/event/armys-aviation-restructure-initiative-view-states
This video is well worth watching and highlights some very important issues with ARI. It is clear the participants took the high road, whereas Active Duty seems to struggle with this - time and again Active Duty has attacked the National Guard and have broken the “One Team, One Fight” concept.
The panel emphasized an important point: now is the time for all hands on deck. “One Team, One Fight” is just as important as ever, especially considering all the uncertainty and violence that is going on throughout our unpredictable world.
BRAND NEW! RELATIVE COMBAT CAPABILITY: AH vs. KW
As the slides below ask, what analysis of relative combat capability led the Army to determine the number of additional Apaches needed in the AC Combat Aviation Brigades to fill the void created by divestiture of the OH-58D?
ARI proposes to replace 30 OH-58D KW with 24 AH-64 Apache (AH) in the AC CABs. These additional 24 Apaches per AC CAB would come from the Guard CABs, leaving the NG with no CABs and no Apaches. Consider the following...
- 24 AH in for 30 KW out creates a ratio to .8 KW to 1 AH
- The purchase price of a KW is $11m while the purchase price of an AH is $35m. This creates a ratio of .3KW to 1 AH
- If a Kiowa Warrior is 30% the purchase cost compared to an Apache, but it is 80% as capable as an Apache, why did we buy any Apaches in the first place?
alternatives_to_ari_-_a_better_option_1.15v2.pptx |
The NDAA says that not more than 48 Apaches can be taken from the Guard - the key words here being: NOT MORE THAN. Who says we have to give up 48? Why not 24? Why any? Who is the authority on this decision? Why not wait til the commission presents its findings - THAT is the prudent answer.
In reality, Active Duty already has 15 of the 192 Guard Apaches, so if the NDAA only allows up to 48, this allows for a transfer of not more than 33 Apaches come October 2015.
BRAND NEW! BreakingDefense just released an op-ed written by NGAUS President Gus Hargett, found online at: http://breakingdefense.com/2015/01/ngaus-commission-must-rethink-whos-really-ready/#disqus_thread
As pointed out by retired Major General, now NGAUS President Hargett, "America is short on airlift and sealift. Only a small number of light units can reach the fight tonight or even tomorrow or the day after that. In fact, it would take several months, as it did in the first Persian Gulf War and the invasion of Iraq, to prepare and move overseas a large active-component fighting force. In that same amount of time, Army Guard brigades could be mobilized, trained and delivered anywhere in the world. This has been done often in the years since 9/11. The Guard has never failed to answer a call.
So aren’t those late-arriving active-component units a reserve force as well, far costlier than the same units in the Army Guard, yet no quicker to the battlefield? This is a key issue for the commission as it considers the proper balance of reserve and active components for the Army."
Republican Mac Thornberry of Texas recently replaced Buck McKeon as the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. In a new article on National Defense, he made clear “The Pentagon should be reminded that Congress has a constitutional authority to determine the “size, shape and soul of the military,” Thornberry said on January 20th at the American Enterprise Institute. "Sometimes their priorities [at the Pentagon] are just plain wrong.”
Thornberry said he expects military officials to be candid about their funding needs, even if they sidestep the party line. “We expect the chiefs [of the military services] to shoot straight with us… we have to have the information. Their obligation is not just to the president but to the country and to Congress.”
“It’s not clear that everyone understands our constitutional system. Congress is sometimes criticized for exercising its proper role in defense.” He added, “But with the volatility in the world situation right now, most of us want to be pretty careful about giving things away because it’s going to be really hard to get them back. … If we give up a base or a training range, it’s gone forever.” If we take up Apaches out of the Guard, they would also be gone forever.
Representative Thornberry brings up a great point regarding the volatility of the world. The commission and our Nation needs to consider what the next conflict will look like. Will it be another OEF/OIF? Who says the next fight will be in a small country like Afghanistan? It could be a much larger nation, nations that occupy the majority of a continent. Look at the uncertainty surrounding Ukraine, or issues arising in the pivot to the Pacific Rim and the shift to Asia. The next conflict could be between similar sized large-scale nation against nation, where all forces are at war – all Active Duty, Guard & Reserve forces – for a long duration, i.e. 2 to 3 years or longer. An Active Duty Army is important, but the Guard & Reserves is and will continue to be, according to Gus Hargett, "the Army’s primary combat reserve, designed to arrive at the fight after the match has been struck."
Time and again the Guard has met the mission in the regional conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, but is ultimately designed as a large-scale operational reserve. It can meet both missions, but not if it is continued to be downsized. As one of comments on this site [see below or the blue quick link at the top of the page] points out, as does the recent article in National Defense, we have to keep funding the remanufacturing of main battle tanks. Case in point: Russia is manufacturing 2300+ new tanks known as the T-14 Armata, with production to be complete by the year 2020. Who knows what the next high intensity conflict will bring?
Food for thought... wouldn't it make more sense for the AC to be downsized by shifting these costly, paid-for-daily soldiers to the Guard & Reserves, where they can continue to be called upon when duty requires, but for 1/3rd the cost? What the commission really needs to be asking is: why are we as a Nation continuing to pay so much for a large standing Active Duty Army, when we could pay a lot less for the same assets realigned to Guard & Reserve?
Plans call for the Guard to be reduced from 350k to 335k, some plans call for numbers as low as 315k. In reality, the size of the Guard should be increased. The commission needs to consider how high it is willing to increase the Guard. What about 500k? Tough questions for tough times. Rather than take Apaches from the Guard, wouldn’t it make more sense to give more Apaches to the Guard? More ARBs, more ARSs, more CABs, more BCTs to the Guard.
The role of Active Duty is to provide the initial surge in times of conflict… the first to roll out, wherever duty calls. At the same time, the RC can ramp up, and within 45 – 60 days be ready to start back-filling Active Duty. Besides, as mentioned there is a restricting factor of deploying much of the Active Duty quickly due to limited Strat Air and slow sea transportation. It’s time to return to the pre WW2 model of a larger RC and a smaller AC, especially in this time of a limited military budget and sequestration.
Sources:
Reference Hargett
http://breakingdefense.com/2015/01/ngaus-commission-must-rethink-whos-really-ready/
Reference Thornberry
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=1718
BRAND NEW! THE REAL COST: COMPARING $ of AC vs. NG ARBS
In the slide below, you can see the annual cost comparison for one Apache Helicopter Battalion between Active Duty versus National Guard. An important point to understand here is that the manning and equipment of an Active Duty Battalion and Guard Battalion are EXACTLY THE SAME. This is what has allowed the Guard to "plug and play" into combat roles in Afghanistan and Iraq.
ac_vs_ng_apache_bn_cost_difference.pptx |
If the Guard were to keep all eight of their CABs (Combat Aviation Brigades), and acquire two more CABs from Active Duty, this would save ONE BILLION DOLLARS ANNUALLY! Here's the math behind this... one Active Duty CAB costs $666 million annually. Subtract the cost of one National Guard CAB, which costs about a third, or $204 million, annually:
666 - 204 = 462 million. 462 million x 2 CABs transferred to the Guard equals 924 million, just shy of $1 billion dollars.
That would still leave Active Duty with 10 CABs, a sizable force that could still meet the operational needs of the Army but reduce the annual cost of the defense budget significantly.
In this time of a limited military budget and sequestration, the answer is clear: reduce Active Duty and shift these critical assets to the National Guard!
The same day that BreakingDefense published the op-ed from NGAUS, it published another op-ed from AUSA: Association of the United States Army. Basically, AUSA is the Active Duty's version of NGAUS: National Guard Association of the U.S.
In the article, President of AUSA and former Chief of Staff of the Army 4 Star General Gordon Sullivan calls for a calm and big picture perspective. He highlights 5 items that he feels need to be addressed:
1. Stabilize the Budget
2. Time for a True Total Force Discussion
3. Stop Scaring People
4. Every Theater is Important
5. Avoid Permanent Harm
According to Mr. Sullivan, "There is a serious risk that gains in cooperation made over the last decade of war could go for naught, which would be a severe blow at a time when the Army will have less that 1 million soldiers and when capabilities of all elements of the Army must be maximized.
We will need a mature, unemotional dialogue within the Total Force, which will then enable Army leaders to articulate with one voice the needs and requirements of an Army with critical missions at home and abroad. Healing the rift between the Regular Army and Army National Guard needs to be a priority."
Ultimately, his message seems to be one of compromise and for finding the right solution for our military. Hear, hear.
He adds, "With ongoing budget cuts in all categories, at some point the nation needs to accept the reality that our most precious, capable, and flexible weapon system is people... indeed, technology enables our warriors, but skilled and confident leaders will be needed to carry the day."
Source:
http://breakingdefense.com/2015/01/ausa-seeking-stability-in-2015/
The Army was advocating "One Team One Fight" – why are some like General Barclay, COL John Lindsay, COL Frank Tate, and others questioning what has worked over the last dozen years? This concept is just as relevant now as ever.
one_team_one_fight.docx |
the_emperors_new_clothes.docx |
In the fiscal 2015 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress blocked the move, along with changes to related personnel, until at least 2016. The bill also creates a National Commission on the Future of the U.S. Army to study the size and force mixture of active and reserve components.
"Congress did the right thing by saying no to a Pentagon plan to cut the Army National Guard and remove much of its combat air capability," Utah Gov. Gary Herbert said recently at a State of the States speech in Washington. "This year, a commission will review the role of the Army National Guard. We fully intend to communicate how the Guard's cost-effectiveness and more than 10 years of combat experience should be leveraged to meet the new threats and economic realities facing the nation."
"We already know that the Pentagon intends to resubmit plans to reduce the size of the Army Guard and to remove the Guard's Apache helicopters," said Herbert, who serves as the vice chairman of the National Governors Association. "Governors and Congress said no once. And we will say it again. The Guard is the most cost-effective, combat-ready force in our nation's arsenal."
The hope is the Air Force's recent experience could serve as a model for the Army, provided the commission has the time to do the analysis they need to do, and take an independent look.
The Council of Governors (Council) was created by the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 and formally established by Executive Order 13528, issued on January 11, 2010. The Council is intended to serve as a mechanism for governors and key federal officials to address matters pertaining to the National Guard, homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities.
Read the full article:
http://www.airforcetimes.com/story/military/2015/01/06/governors-block-army-guard-plans/21336435/
Recently, at the National Governor's Association "State of the States" address, Governor Hickenlooper of Colorado and Governor Herbert of Utah shared some very useful words and wisdom. The video of their address is at the link below. There are two minutes in particular that relate to the Guard, beginning at ~ 37:30 of the 43 minute long video.
Also, take a moment to read what the Council of Governors had to say to former SECDEF Hagel in a recent letter.
gov_council_letter_to_hagel_dated_6_jan_2015.pdf |
Recently, NGB had a meeting where several Courses of Action (COAs) were discussed, outlining 4 possible COAs regarding where the 48 Guard Apaches will come from. Their selection is supposed to briefed as early as the end of January 2015.
Everyone in the Guard needs to be familiar with this plan, as EVERY State & Territory will be affected by ARI, not just the 9 States with Apaches and Tennessee with the loss of their OH-58D Kiowas. If the Guard loses these aircraft, there will inevitability be a large scale cross-leveling between all States, to balance aviation across the Nation - Blackhawks, Chinooks, and Lakotas will have to be redistributed for the losses due to ARI.
1.) 2 States volunteer to give up their ARBs.
2.) 2 States give up their ARBs by grading metrics (discussed below).
3. 2 States give up their ARB by grading metrics, and those 2 States that lose their ARBs will share aircraft from the remaining bottom 2 Guard ARBs. Known as "Pick 2, plus 2."
4.) All 8 ARBs remain, collectively give up 48 Guard Apaches.
The best COA offered is to share the losses across all 8 units, leaving each unit with ~ 18 Apaches. This minimizes impact to any one particular unit, and keeps the losses equitable until the commission reveals their findings in February 2016. The other three COAs unfairly pit the units against one another, and will result in units being compared or graded, using metrics that may or may not be fair. This is done by using a combination of the UAT (Unit Assessment Tool), USR (Unit Status Report), and what is known as the "Aviation Scorecard."
There is a problem with the metrics... in particular, for units that deploy. Upon returning from deployment, ARBs enter a "reset year" - a mandatory C-5 rating. The top rating a unit can hold is C-1. Units are forced to hold a C-5 rating the year after their deployment, this effectively penalizes ARBs that DO deploy. The USR should looked at over a window of 6 years, and those unit that deploy should be able to count their best 5 of the 6 years. Put another way, the UAT is a 5 year model to ensure the ARFORGEN cycle is accounted for. A 6 year cycle for deploying units with the RESET year removed would be more appropriate; keep the 5 year for the non-deployers.
NGB needs to clearly state what metrics are being used in their assessments. And what should not be counted against any unit is how many aircraft it is currently fielded, as this also unfairly affects a unit's "C" rating. Individual ARBs have no say in how many Apaches they are fielded - they simply have what they are given. It should simply be based upon empirical and clearly measurable performance metrics. And, just as importantly, let the States see in writing the results and standings of the metrics.
THE REAL PROBLEM WITH DISMANTLING 2 GUARD ARBs...
If 2 States lose ALL of their aircraft in October, then the entire unit will become what is known as Readiness Level (RL) 3. Basically, rendering it completely ineffective and it will take a VERY long time for the unit to get all of its aviators requalified and fit for combat. If an aviator does not fly for 180 days, they become RL 3. Without aircraft, an entire unit is rendered obsolete, making it easy pickings to get rid of. From October 1st (when the aircraft are lost to Active Duty) to March (when the commission is supposed to brief their findings) is ~ 180 days. This 6 month gap is very convenient for Active Duty, because even if the commission determines to give all aircraft back to the Guard, it may be decided by the powers that be to let the 2 units [that lost their aircraft] to just be dismantled based on the fact that the entire unit will be unqualified at that point.
The prudent solution is for all 8 Guard ARBs to cross-level their losses, so that all 8 units remain intact, with some aircraft to train with and maintain currency/proficiency. That way, if the commissions elect to keep all 8 ARBs, the units are still trained and ready.
A PICTURE IS WORTH A THOUSAND WORDS
What happened to fiscal responsibility to our tax payers? What is the Army doing with "old" Apaches? See for yourself what Active Duty is doing to what they consider “old” aircraft:
NEW! REBUTTAL TO THE ACRC TIGER TEAM PRELIM FINDINGS
Back in November, CAPE (Center for the Army Profession and Ethic) released a presentation comparing effectiveness and cost analysis of Apache ARBs between AC vs. NG. The presentation itself was classified FOUO, so the .ppt brief cannot be placed on the site.
Download the file below to read a rebuttal to the CAPE brief:
rebuttal_to_the_acrc_tiger_team_prelim_findings_v1.0.docx |
SOMEONE BLOW THE WHISTLE!
The latest article from ArmyTimes makes it clear that the Active Duty is moving ahead with its plan, in direct violation of the recently released NDAA. In particular, Section 1712 of Title XVII re: National Commission on the Future of the Army, Subtitle B - Related Limitations, which VERY clearly states on page 955: the Army may not, before March 31, 2016, divest, retire, or transfer, or prepare to divest, retire, or transfer, any AH-64 Apache helicopters from the Army National Guard to the regular Army; or reduce personnel [related to the AH-64 Apache Guard units]... below the levels of such personnel as of September 30th, 2014.
And yet, despite this, according to the latest article on ArmyTimes: "Officials spearheading the effort, which has been challenged by the National Guard and its advocates, were confident the plan would proceed, saying the service has already taken broad steps toward it, canceling training, transferring air frames and shuffling budget dollars.
'The point is we are moving out with implementation,' Col. John Lindsay, the director for Army aviation in the service's operations, plans and policy arm. 'Aviation restructuring is happening.'"
How is this even legal? Someone on the Hill needs to blow the whistle! Since when can the Army go against the NDAA?
The NDAA has authorized 2 types of commissions, one of which is already underway: the Comptroller General of the Government of Accountability Office (GAO) study, whom must report to Congress by 1 March 2015; the second is a non-governmental commission, which must report by February 2016. Selected members of the commission need to be unbiased, objective, and without ulterior motives... meaning it should not include soon-to-retire General Barclay, who coauthored ARI and is now lobbying to get himself on the commission.
See for yourself: a copy of the extract of the NDAA is posted below.
ndaa_extract.pdf |
With the OH-58D Kiowa Helicopter all but retired by the Army, there is NO immediate replacement for the scout helicopter. why hasn't the Army found a new scout helicopter replacement for the OH-58D?why hasn't the Army found a new scout helicopter replacement for the OH-58D?Why? In the meantime, the Army has implemented a Manned-Unmanned concept, which includes partnering the Apache with Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), such as the Shadow or the Grey Eagle platforms. This is a very expensive concept.
Asked about talks with Bell Helicopters about the plan, COL Walter Rugen, chief of the Army Force Development Directorate's Aviation Division, said the Army is working on a Congressionally mandated study of the ARI's impact on the industrial base. Army aviation officials, he said, "are mindful we need to have a light hand on industry partners, because they provide us with these great capabilities."
The plan calls for the divestment of more than 780 legacy systems, including TH-67s and OH-58s. Why not increase production of the AH-6 "Little Bird," a proven scout / light attack helicopter that the Active Duty used for years, and the 160th SOAR still uses to this day? In other words, Special Ops is ALREADY using this helicopter - the airframe is already approved and is being used by the Army.
All the Army needs to do is approve the AH-6 for replacement of the OH-58D. The "logistics train" of this airframe is already in place - production just needs to be widened. The MD-500, the civilian equivalent of the AH-6, is a widely sold and frequently used airframe worldwide. It is a cost-effective solution in lieu of ARI and does not decimate the Apache operational reserve the Guard provides. Furthermore, this would give a home to the OH-58D pilots who are losing their airframes, and would be an easier transition for these pilots, already trained in the scout role.
TIT FOR TAT: COMPARING THE COSTS
- An AH-64D Longbow Apache is estimated to cost ~ 25 million USD; an AH-64E Guardian is estimated to cost ~ 35 million USD.
- A MQ-1C Grey Eagle is estimated to cost ~ 31 million USD - nearly $6 million MORE than a Longbow.
- If you total the cost of a AH-64E with a MQ-1C - part of the Army's planned Manned-Unmanned concept [to replace the OH-58D in its scout role] - the total cost is ~ 66 million USD.
- Whereas, an AH-6 "Little Bird" is estimated to cost between 4 and 5 million USD, depending on the variation.
You don't need a calculator to see the glaring financial issues with this. Why is the Army preparing to replace the OH-58D with the MQ-1C, when it could have a proven airframe for a fraction of the cost? The AH-6 is an easy solution and could be implemented very quickly. Furthermore, rather than purchase additional LUH-72 Lakota helicopters to replace the TH-67 helicopter for flight school training, why not use the AH-6? It is significantly cheaper than a Lakota - arguably ~ 3 million USD less, per airframe.