SOMEONE'S GOTTA ASK THE TOUGH QUESTIONS
In a story last year on BreakingDefense, it is clear that the Army is not
willing to change their plans. General Odierno acknowledged, "The Guard having no Apaches is one of them." There is a term for this – it's called hoarding, which is exactly what Active Duty is preparing to do. Read the full story @ http://breakingdefense.com/2014/01/budgets-betrayal-national-guard-fights-to-keep-apache-gunships/
There are two sides to every story... and usually one is more true than the other. See the rebuttal to the Active Duty position in the above article halfway down this page.
TEN TOUGH QUESTIONS:
1. If the Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI) is approved, it gives Active Duty potentially up to 60 EXTRA Apaches, all from the Guard, which will then be spread across the Active Duty flying fleet - not including aircraft diverted to Fort Rucker as well as those planned for storage facilities. What is the purpose of this?
2. Where did the money go for the numerous Congressional add-ins that authorized funds specifically set aside for the Guard to convert 7 of the 8 AH-64D Apache Battalions to the new AH-64E Guardian?
3. Where did the $50 Billion from Congress go for the 12th and 13th CABs? And did the newly stood up 12th CAB receive all of their aircraft? Did 13th CAB at Fort Carson, due to be stood up in April of this year, receive their aircraft? If not, how are these funds being used? If they haven't received their aircraft, is this one of the reasons Active Duty wants the Guard Apaches?
4. Under OCO (Overseas Contingency Operations) Funding, when a helicopter crashes in combat, money is set aside to fund the loss and field a replacement helicopter. Did these OCO funds really go to what they were intended for – to replace crashed AH-64s in combat? Is Active Duty planning to fill their Apache helicopter losses with the Guard's Apaches?
5. When the Attack Recon Helicopter (ARH – a.k.a. Comanche) Program was cancelled, where did all of the program funding go? Some was used for critical programs such as CMWS, MTADS, and other aircraft modernizations, but clearly not all.
6. Several years ago, 8 AH-64D Block 2 Apaches were bought using the cancelled ARH Program funds. These helicopters were to go to the Western Army Aviation Training Site (WAATS), a National Guard training facility. Why did Active Duty keep the aircraft? Apparently some were sent to Fort Rucker, the others provided to plus up the war shortages from Active Duty crashes.
7. Why does Fort Rucker, home of the Army Aviation Flight School, need so many Apache helicopters for its training programs, when the number of students going through the program has been drastically reduced in the last two years? Many of the Apaches at Fort Rucker are on loan from Guard units. It's time to give these aircraft back.
8. Fort Rucker provides flight training to foreign countries. These countries pay for this training – where does that money go?
9. Is Active Duty hiding Apache helicopters? Active Duty needs to show 100% accountability for every Apache, by serial number, by location, across the entire fleet.
10. How many of the Guard's Apaches were funded by Congressional add-ins for the Guard? How many of the Guard's Apaches were funded by NGREA? Why is Active Duty not discussing any of this with the States that possess the helicopters?
NGREA is the National Guard & Reserve Equipment Account, and provides funds for equipment specifically for the Guard & Reserves. To read more about NGREA, and why Guard assets are protected under this fund, read the below articles:
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/122506p.pdf
http://www.ngaus.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NGAUS%20101%20-%20NGREA.pdf
http://www.nationalguard.mil/features/ngps/2012/National%20Guard%20and%20Reserve%20Equipment%20Account%20NGREA%20Jan%2011.pdf
The Guard has been and continues to be transparent. Can Active Duty do the same?
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If you read the fine print of the Aviation Restructure Plan, Active Duty plans to add one extra AH-64
Apache per company, across the Army – at the expense of taking ALL Apaches from the Guard! The
Army plans to have 10 Combat Aviation Brigades (CABs) on Active Duty, and each CAB will have 2
Apache Battalions. This equates to a total of 20 Apache Battalions, all on Active Duty. Every Battalion
has three flight companies. 20 Apache Battalions multiplied by three excess Apaches per Battalion
equals 60 EXTRA Apache helicopters! Why? Besides replacing aircraft Active Duty continues to crash, is there something else going on? A hidden agenda perhaps?
In the below article from BreakingDefense, there are several points made be Active Duty that are simply not true.
http://breakingdefense.com/2014/01/budgets-betrayal-national-guard-fights-to-keep-apache-gunships/
In response to General Odierno's statement, "“I can’t afford all the fleets of aircraft I have right now. We can’t afford them.…It is impossible under the budget that we’ve been given.” Here's where he's wrong... the Army CAN afford them, if they give more to the Guard, rather than take. The Guard is a very viable option to maintain force structure at a significantly reduced savings.
Regarding the "readiness and accessibility" of the Guard, the Guard has been dictated to by Active Duty when and where they could deploy. And as for how quickly a Guard unit can spool up for an overseas mission, a well trained Apache Battalion is always ready. Guard pilots train vigorously throughout the year so that they are ready for any mission, day or night, in any environment. The only time necessary to prepare a Guard Apache Battalion is getting their soldiers through the same red tape that any Active Duty unit goes through in preparation to deploy – things like dental and medical screening, PT tests, and of course lots of paperwork. Saying that the Guard is not ready or accessible means that Active Duty doesn't understand or simply chooses to ignore the readiness of their own force. With home station mobilization, Guard Apache units could be ready in approximately 30 - 60 days.
Military Strategic Air Lift aircraft (C-5, C-17, C-130) are in short supply. Military sea transport are also in short supply. Civilian aircraft and boats are used to supplement the shortages, but it still takes three or more months just to get the majority of Active Duty into a new combat zone – this is more than enough time for Guard Apache Battalions to be ready for a follow on deployment immediately following the insertion of Active Duty.
As for the cost to mobilize a Guard unit, rather than send the entire unit halfway across the country to an Active Duty base, such as Fort Hood, the Army could save millions annually, if not billions, by doing home station mobilization. This would eliminate the expensive travel costs of moving entire Battalions – just over 400 soldiers for an Apache Battalion – and at the some time streamline the entire mobilization process. A small team of approximately 10 individuals from 1st Army (the Army's training force) could travel to the Guard unit, rather than send 400+ Guard soldiers to 1st Army. Look at the Air Force way of doing business – they deploy the Air Guard quickly, so why can't the Army?
As for the Active Duty complaint of "deployment after deployment," Guard units in the last 12 years often had to lobby on their own behalf just to be called upon. One of the biggest issues for Active Duty is that commanders at all levels change command every two years – and of course every commander wants a deployment "under their belt" as commander, as it is considered good for your career and helps get you promoted. Some have surmised that Active Duty has purposely kept the Guard on "the sidelines" to further the career progression of their own command.
As quoted in the article: "The Guard and Reserve are losing 15 percent of their combat aviation brigades, the active component 23 percent." A key point to understand is something the Active Duty Army is not acknowledging – if the Apache and Kiowa helicopters are stripped from the Guard, the Guard no longer has Combat Aviation Brigades (CABs), but simply Aviation Brigades (ABs). In other words, the Guard would lose ALL of it's COMBAT Aviation Brigades. Blackhawks, Chinooks, and Lakotas are utility helicopters, with no true combat power. This means the Guard is no longer in a position to fulfill its federal role – that being to supplement Active Duty in times of conflict. And this is something that needs to be very carefully evaluated, for it raises serious issues with our Constitution.
It is unclear where Active Duty is getting their average flight hours per month per crews from, but despite what they say, Guard aviators fly just as much as Active Duty aviators during training at home. So the argument that the Guard may be less ready than Active Duty is a fallacy. Guard aviators are at least on par with Active Duty aviators in all areas of proficiency. In many cases, Guard aviators more so, simply from the fact that they have, on average, significantly more flight time and time in service. Furthermore, Guard units regularly train with other branches of the military throughout the year – doing complex, high-intensity joint missions with the Air Force, Navy, Marines, & SOCOM, not to mention AC and RC Army ground maneuver units.
The argument that Guard helicopters are more costly to maintain because they fly less than Active Duty is, again, not true, because the Guard does fly just as much as Active Duty during training when not deployed, if not more so. And if it just so happens that certain Guard units do fly less than some Active Duty units, this is only because Active Duty dictates the annual flying budget. Want the Guard to fly more? Give the Guard more money.
Why does the Governor need Apache helicopters? Well, why does the Governor need A-10s, F-15s, F-16s, F-22, & F-35s? The Air Force Guard have combat aviation assets for a reason – the same reason being argued that the Army National Guard should. It's not necessarily about a State providing regional defense to a specific area of our Nation – it's about keeping assets and experience in the Guard. Doing so provides a ready and well trained reserve. Perhaps the Army should study and learn from the Air Force model – Active Duty Air Force and Air Guard & Reserves seem to integrate much more seamlessly.
There are two sides to every story... and usually one is more true than the other. See the rebuttal to the Active Duty position in the above article halfway down this page.
TEN TOUGH QUESTIONS:
1. If the Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI) is approved, it gives Active Duty potentially up to 60 EXTRA Apaches, all from the Guard, which will then be spread across the Active Duty flying fleet - not including aircraft diverted to Fort Rucker as well as those planned for storage facilities. What is the purpose of this?
2. Where did the money go for the numerous Congressional add-ins that authorized funds specifically set aside for the Guard to convert 7 of the 8 AH-64D Apache Battalions to the new AH-64E Guardian?
3. Where did the $50 Billion from Congress go for the 12th and 13th CABs? And did the newly stood up 12th CAB receive all of their aircraft? Did 13th CAB at Fort Carson, due to be stood up in April of this year, receive their aircraft? If not, how are these funds being used? If they haven't received their aircraft, is this one of the reasons Active Duty wants the Guard Apaches?
4. Under OCO (Overseas Contingency Operations) Funding, when a helicopter crashes in combat, money is set aside to fund the loss and field a replacement helicopter. Did these OCO funds really go to what they were intended for – to replace crashed AH-64s in combat? Is Active Duty planning to fill their Apache helicopter losses with the Guard's Apaches?
5. When the Attack Recon Helicopter (ARH – a.k.a. Comanche) Program was cancelled, where did all of the program funding go? Some was used for critical programs such as CMWS, MTADS, and other aircraft modernizations, but clearly not all.
6. Several years ago, 8 AH-64D Block 2 Apaches were bought using the cancelled ARH Program funds. These helicopters were to go to the Western Army Aviation Training Site (WAATS), a National Guard training facility. Why did Active Duty keep the aircraft? Apparently some were sent to Fort Rucker, the others provided to plus up the war shortages from Active Duty crashes.
7. Why does Fort Rucker, home of the Army Aviation Flight School, need so many Apache helicopters for its training programs, when the number of students going through the program has been drastically reduced in the last two years? Many of the Apaches at Fort Rucker are on loan from Guard units. It's time to give these aircraft back.
8. Fort Rucker provides flight training to foreign countries. These countries pay for this training – where does that money go?
9. Is Active Duty hiding Apache helicopters? Active Duty needs to show 100% accountability for every Apache, by serial number, by location, across the entire fleet.
10. How many of the Guard's Apaches were funded by Congressional add-ins for the Guard? How many of the Guard's Apaches were funded by NGREA? Why is Active Duty not discussing any of this with the States that possess the helicopters?
NGREA is the National Guard & Reserve Equipment Account, and provides funds for equipment specifically for the Guard & Reserves. To read more about NGREA, and why Guard assets are protected under this fund, read the below articles:
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/122506p.pdf
http://www.ngaus.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NGAUS%20101%20-%20NGREA.pdf
http://www.nationalguard.mil/features/ngps/2012/National%20Guard%20and%20Reserve%20Equipment%20Account%20NGREA%20Jan%2011.pdf
The Guard has been and continues to be transparent. Can Active Duty do the same?
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
If you read the fine print of the Aviation Restructure Plan, Active Duty plans to add one extra AH-64
Apache per company, across the Army – at the expense of taking ALL Apaches from the Guard! The
Army plans to have 10 Combat Aviation Brigades (CABs) on Active Duty, and each CAB will have 2
Apache Battalions. This equates to a total of 20 Apache Battalions, all on Active Duty. Every Battalion
has three flight companies. 20 Apache Battalions multiplied by three excess Apaches per Battalion
equals 60 EXTRA Apache helicopters! Why? Besides replacing aircraft Active Duty continues to crash, is there something else going on? A hidden agenda perhaps?
In the below article from BreakingDefense, there are several points made be Active Duty that are simply not true.
http://breakingdefense.com/2014/01/budgets-betrayal-national-guard-fights-to-keep-apache-gunships/
In response to General Odierno's statement, "“I can’t afford all the fleets of aircraft I have right now. We can’t afford them.…It is impossible under the budget that we’ve been given.” Here's where he's wrong... the Army CAN afford them, if they give more to the Guard, rather than take. The Guard is a very viable option to maintain force structure at a significantly reduced savings.
Regarding the "readiness and accessibility" of the Guard, the Guard has been dictated to by Active Duty when and where they could deploy. And as for how quickly a Guard unit can spool up for an overseas mission, a well trained Apache Battalion is always ready. Guard pilots train vigorously throughout the year so that they are ready for any mission, day or night, in any environment. The only time necessary to prepare a Guard Apache Battalion is getting their soldiers through the same red tape that any Active Duty unit goes through in preparation to deploy – things like dental and medical screening, PT tests, and of course lots of paperwork. Saying that the Guard is not ready or accessible means that Active Duty doesn't understand or simply chooses to ignore the readiness of their own force. With home station mobilization, Guard Apache units could be ready in approximately 30 - 60 days.
Military Strategic Air Lift aircraft (C-5, C-17, C-130) are in short supply. Military sea transport are also in short supply. Civilian aircraft and boats are used to supplement the shortages, but it still takes three or more months just to get the majority of Active Duty into a new combat zone – this is more than enough time for Guard Apache Battalions to be ready for a follow on deployment immediately following the insertion of Active Duty.
As for the cost to mobilize a Guard unit, rather than send the entire unit halfway across the country to an Active Duty base, such as Fort Hood, the Army could save millions annually, if not billions, by doing home station mobilization. This would eliminate the expensive travel costs of moving entire Battalions – just over 400 soldiers for an Apache Battalion – and at the some time streamline the entire mobilization process. A small team of approximately 10 individuals from 1st Army (the Army's training force) could travel to the Guard unit, rather than send 400+ Guard soldiers to 1st Army. Look at the Air Force way of doing business – they deploy the Air Guard quickly, so why can't the Army?
As for the Active Duty complaint of "deployment after deployment," Guard units in the last 12 years often had to lobby on their own behalf just to be called upon. One of the biggest issues for Active Duty is that commanders at all levels change command every two years – and of course every commander wants a deployment "under their belt" as commander, as it is considered good for your career and helps get you promoted. Some have surmised that Active Duty has purposely kept the Guard on "the sidelines" to further the career progression of their own command.
As quoted in the article: "The Guard and Reserve are losing 15 percent of their combat aviation brigades, the active component 23 percent." A key point to understand is something the Active Duty Army is not acknowledging – if the Apache and Kiowa helicopters are stripped from the Guard, the Guard no longer has Combat Aviation Brigades (CABs), but simply Aviation Brigades (ABs). In other words, the Guard would lose ALL of it's COMBAT Aviation Brigades. Blackhawks, Chinooks, and Lakotas are utility helicopters, with no true combat power. This means the Guard is no longer in a position to fulfill its federal role – that being to supplement Active Duty in times of conflict. And this is something that needs to be very carefully evaluated, for it raises serious issues with our Constitution.
It is unclear where Active Duty is getting their average flight hours per month per crews from, but despite what they say, Guard aviators fly just as much as Active Duty aviators during training at home. So the argument that the Guard may be less ready than Active Duty is a fallacy. Guard aviators are at least on par with Active Duty aviators in all areas of proficiency. In many cases, Guard aviators more so, simply from the fact that they have, on average, significantly more flight time and time in service. Furthermore, Guard units regularly train with other branches of the military throughout the year – doing complex, high-intensity joint missions with the Air Force, Navy, Marines, & SOCOM, not to mention AC and RC Army ground maneuver units.
The argument that Guard helicopters are more costly to maintain because they fly less than Active Duty is, again, not true, because the Guard does fly just as much as Active Duty during training when not deployed, if not more so. And if it just so happens that certain Guard units do fly less than some Active Duty units, this is only because Active Duty dictates the annual flying budget. Want the Guard to fly more? Give the Guard more money.
Why does the Governor need Apache helicopters? Well, why does the Governor need A-10s, F-15s, F-16s, F-22, & F-35s? The Air Force Guard have combat aviation assets for a reason – the same reason being argued that the Army National Guard should. It's not necessarily about a State providing regional defense to a specific area of our Nation – it's about keeping assets and experience in the Guard. Doing so provides a ready and well trained reserve. Perhaps the Army should study and learn from the Air Force model – Active Duty Air Force and Air Guard & Reserves seem to integrate much more seamlessly.
MORE QUESTIONS THAT NEED ANSWERING...
What are some questions you would ask the top Army Brass?
1. Why did they not go through the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) process?
2. Have they considered the true cost of the experience they are discarding?
3. Have they read Article 1, Section 8 of the US Constitution? Not to mention the National Guard acts of 1916 and 1949? Seriously.
4. And, what strategic planning supports this decision?
What are five questions you would have Congress ask the Army about their Aviation Restructure Initiative?
1. How this so called [AAAA] luncheon "they" are holding isn't to be construed as direct solicitation and/or lobbying of Congress by the Army in contravention of public law, exposing everyone to investigation and or charges?
2. Considering that the SpeedHawk, developed by Piasecki as a quasi-subcontractor to Boeing, in Boeing's facility at New Castle County Airport in Wilmington, Delaware, was successfully flown nearly two years ago, and that Boeing received a Mike Model UH-60 from the AC to modify at their facility in Ridley Park, and that there have been open discussions with Boeing employees that the Army intends to do the same with the AH-64... how is this, coupled with the Army's stated intent of using the AH-64 as an Scout Attack aircraft, not completely modify this airframe to the extend that it would meet the criteria of a new MDS (Mission Data Set) aircraft, and having such extensive modifications to the basic airframe that this process doesn't circumvent the sole source vendor and/or proper procurement procedures through competitive bid?
3. Explain why, for the past 40 years, the Army, other services and nations, have conducted initial flight training in a cost effective, single engine helicopter, yet the US Army NOW chooses to make people believe that there is cost savings in training personnel in a twin engine aircraft that has near a $5 million replacement cost? Explain how even a COTS (Commercial Off-the-Shelf) single-engine helicopter, comparable to that of the Hughes 300 or Enstrum – at a market price of $250,000 – couldn't be used as the initial training [platform] because once a single LUH-72 is lost for any reason, that $5 million could obviously pay for ten other trainers at $250k?
4. Define what the replacement airframe is to the UH-60, when that is forthcoming, and how that timeline will offset the issues experienced by the Guard the entire time the UH-60 was fielded to the Guard and the UH-1 fleet was disposed of? Specifically, how is the Army going to continue funding the UH-60 throughout the process so as to not create anymore reduction to the MTOE fills that already exist?
5. How will the AC support the Guard's Congressionally funded mission along the SW border and similar missions? Especially considering that the LUH-72 has demonstrated on numerous occasions that it is capable of operating in a non-permissive environment.
1. Why did they not go through the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) process?
2. Have they considered the true cost of the experience they are discarding?
3. Have they read Article 1, Section 8 of the US Constitution? Not to mention the National Guard acts of 1916 and 1949? Seriously.
4. And, what strategic planning supports this decision?
What are five questions you would have Congress ask the Army about their Aviation Restructure Initiative?
1. How this so called [AAAA] luncheon "they" are holding isn't to be construed as direct solicitation and/or lobbying of Congress by the Army in contravention of public law, exposing everyone to investigation and or charges?
2. Considering that the SpeedHawk, developed by Piasecki as a quasi-subcontractor to Boeing, in Boeing's facility at New Castle County Airport in Wilmington, Delaware, was successfully flown nearly two years ago, and that Boeing received a Mike Model UH-60 from the AC to modify at their facility in Ridley Park, and that there have been open discussions with Boeing employees that the Army intends to do the same with the AH-64... how is this, coupled with the Army's stated intent of using the AH-64 as an Scout Attack aircraft, not completely modify this airframe to the extend that it would meet the criteria of a new MDS (Mission Data Set) aircraft, and having such extensive modifications to the basic airframe that this process doesn't circumvent the sole source vendor and/or proper procurement procedures through competitive bid?
3. Explain why, for the past 40 years, the Army, other services and nations, have conducted initial flight training in a cost effective, single engine helicopter, yet the US Army NOW chooses to make people believe that there is cost savings in training personnel in a twin engine aircraft that has near a $5 million replacement cost? Explain how even a COTS (Commercial Off-the-Shelf) single-engine helicopter, comparable to that of the Hughes 300 or Enstrum – at a market price of $250,000 – couldn't be used as the initial training [platform] because once a single LUH-72 is lost for any reason, that $5 million could obviously pay for ten other trainers at $250k?
4. Define what the replacement airframe is to the UH-60, when that is forthcoming, and how that timeline will offset the issues experienced by the Guard the entire time the UH-60 was fielded to the Guard and the UH-1 fleet was disposed of? Specifically, how is the Army going to continue funding the UH-60 throughout the process so as to not create anymore reduction to the MTOE fills that already exist?
5. How will the AC support the Guard's Congressionally funded mission along the SW border and similar missions? Especially considering that the LUH-72 has demonstrated on numerous occasions that it is capable of operating in a non-permissive environment.