NEW ARTICLE!
A well written article that once again shows why Apaches in the Guard are clearly more cost effective than Active Duty:
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20141020/DEFFEAT05/310200019/Commentary-Reserve-Aviation-Taxpayer-s-Best-Deal
"APACHES WILL STAY IN THE GUARD"
Senator Graham of South Carolina recently spoke to NGAUS and stated "To those who believe that they're going to take combat aviation out of the Guard, you've got another thing coming." He went on to say that America must shake off its reluctance to continue fighting overseas battles and come to grips with the reality it faces: threats posed by terrorists such as ISIS are real. "You can't be war weary at a time when people who want to destroy your way of life are just getting started. We may be tired of fighting them, but they're not tired of fighting us." To view his entire speech, check out:
www.youtube.com/user/NGAUS1878
NEW! Apache helicopters are already being called to action in the fight against ISIS: http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/06/us/isis-apache-helicopters/
And yet... the Army is still convinced that ARI is the answer? If anything, the recent developments in the Middle East should show - now more than ever - that the Guard will always be needed as a combat asset. Leon Panetta, former director of the CIA, is convinced that "we're looking at kind of a 30-year war," arguing that the withdrawal from Iraq created a vacuum that allowed ISIS to rise. Learn more at: http://insider.foxnews.com/2014/10/06/panetta-obama-kind-lost-his-way-battle-against-isis-could-be-30-year-war
The Air Force sees the folly in ARI - why can't the top brass of the Army? Check out: http://www.defensenews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2014309290022
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PREVIOUSLY, ON SAVE THE GUARD...
An interesting article from Breaking Defense on the fight over the Apache: http://breakingdefense.com/2014/07/army-hates-to-take-guard-apaches-but-it-must-happen-under-secretary-carson/
Senate Panel Questions Apache Swap? In short, the Senate Appropriations Committee questioned the Army’s plan to remove all AH-64 Apache helicopters from the Guard and wants a cost analysis of the ARI. Lawmakers also included in the FY15 Defense Appropriations Bill $144 million to buy more Apaches “only for Army National Guard,” according to InsideDefense. Learn more @ http://www.magnetmail.net/actions/email_web_version.cfm?recipient_id=1407566527&message_id=5472773&user_id=NGAUS&group_id=938156&jobid=203#a1
Over the last 5 years, there has been an estimated 15 Class A Apache accidents due to "pilot error" by Active Duty, whereas there has only been one due to "pilot error" by the Guard. In other words, the Guard has less Class A Apache accidents than Active Duty by a ration of 15:1!
NEWS FROM NGAUS!
“National Guardsmen across the country owe a debt of gratitude to the U.S. House of Representatives... for including a provision in the fiscal 2015 National Defense Authorization Act that would create a National Commission on the Future of the Army," said the President of National Guard Association of the U.S., retired Major General Gus Hargett. He added, "This action represents more progress toward our goal of getting America’s Army right for 2020 and beyond."
SUCCESS! On the 21st of May the House voted overwhelmingly in favor of the NDAA, which included H.R. 3930! Of those that voted, 325 voted for, 98 against - in other words, well over 75% of the House are in support of. Next, the NDAA will go before the Senate before final implementation. To learn more about the vote, check out:
http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/ndaa-home?p=ndaa
A well written article that once again shows why Apaches in the Guard are clearly more cost effective than Active Duty:
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20141020/DEFFEAT05/310200019/Commentary-Reserve-Aviation-Taxpayer-s-Best-Deal
"APACHES WILL STAY IN THE GUARD"
Senator Graham of South Carolina recently spoke to NGAUS and stated "To those who believe that they're going to take combat aviation out of the Guard, you've got another thing coming." He went on to say that America must shake off its reluctance to continue fighting overseas battles and come to grips with the reality it faces: threats posed by terrorists such as ISIS are real. "You can't be war weary at a time when people who want to destroy your way of life are just getting started. We may be tired of fighting them, but they're not tired of fighting us." To view his entire speech, check out:
www.youtube.com/user/NGAUS1878
NEW! Apache helicopters are already being called to action in the fight against ISIS: http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/06/us/isis-apache-helicopters/
And yet... the Army is still convinced that ARI is the answer? If anything, the recent developments in the Middle East should show - now more than ever - that the Guard will always be needed as a combat asset. Leon Panetta, former director of the CIA, is convinced that "we're looking at kind of a 30-year war," arguing that the withdrawal from Iraq created a vacuum that allowed ISIS to rise. Learn more at: http://insider.foxnews.com/2014/10/06/panetta-obama-kind-lost-his-way-battle-against-isis-could-be-30-year-war
The Air Force sees the folly in ARI - why can't the top brass of the Army? Check out: http://www.defensenews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2014309290022
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PREVIOUSLY, ON SAVE THE GUARD...
An interesting article from Breaking Defense on the fight over the Apache: http://breakingdefense.com/2014/07/army-hates-to-take-guard-apaches-but-it-must-happen-under-secretary-carson/
Senate Panel Questions Apache Swap? In short, the Senate Appropriations Committee questioned the Army’s plan to remove all AH-64 Apache helicopters from the Guard and wants a cost analysis of the ARI. Lawmakers also included in the FY15 Defense Appropriations Bill $144 million to buy more Apaches “only for Army National Guard,” according to InsideDefense. Learn more @ http://www.magnetmail.net/actions/email_web_version.cfm?recipient_id=1407566527&message_id=5472773&user_id=NGAUS&group_id=938156&jobid=203#a1
Over the last 5 years, there has been an estimated 15 Class A Apache accidents due to "pilot error" by Active Duty, whereas there has only been one due to "pilot error" by the Guard. In other words, the Guard has less Class A Apache accidents than Active Duty by a ration of 15:1!
NEWS FROM NGAUS!
“National Guardsmen across the country owe a debt of gratitude to the U.S. House of Representatives... for including a provision in the fiscal 2015 National Defense Authorization Act that would create a National Commission on the Future of the Army," said the President of National Guard Association of the U.S., retired Major General Gus Hargett. He added, "This action represents more progress toward our goal of getting America’s Army right for 2020 and beyond."
SUCCESS! On the 21st of May the House voted overwhelmingly in favor of the NDAA, which included H.R. 3930! Of those that voted, 325 voted for, 98 against - in other words, well over 75% of the House are in support of. Next, the NDAA will go before the Senate before final implementation. To learn more about the vote, check out:
http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/ndaa-home?p=ndaa
This bill would also prohibit reducing ARNG authorized end-strength levels below 350,000. It also establishes the National Commission on the Future of the Army to review the appropriate mix and structure of the Army and Army National Guard. Already nearly 50% of Senators have cosponsored the bill, and it was just recently released! To learn more about the proposal, and see whose standing behind it, visit:
http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-graham-introduce-bill-to-launch-commission-to-evaluate-army-budget-changes-proposed-by-the-administration
http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-graham-introduce-bill-to-launch-commission-to-evaluate-army-budget-changes-proposed-by-the-administration
state_map_of_sb_2295_cosponsors_05.23.14.pptx |
sb2295_cosponsors_by_state_05.23.2014.docx |
THERE ARE TWO SIDES TO EVERY STORY
Senator Lee recently questioned General Grass and Odierno on the Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI) - see what was said:
http://youtu.be/r2SwkJRdiH8
Both Grass and Odierno are Title 10 - it is important to continue to question senior Army officials, but to be fair... Title 32 Guard Adjutant Generals (TAGs), State Aviation Officers (SAOs), and Apache Battalion Commanders across the Guard also need to be called to testify before Congress and Senate. To learn more about the difference between Title 10 and Title 32, and why this distinction matters, read below.
NEW!
http://breakingdefense.com/2014/04/state-guard-generals-lobby-hill-against-army-plan-to-cut-apaches-endstrength/
In the article, Major General Tonini, the Adjutant-General of Kentucky and head of the Association of Adjutants-General of the US (AGAUS), declares “We have not capitulated to anything.” To read more on what AGAUS had to say to Congress in defense of the Guard, read the below file:
agaus-slides-opposing-army-cuts.pdf |
adjutant-general-tonini-to-congress-2014-04-25.pdf |
NEW! The Guard counter-proposal detailed in the slides below offer to:
- cut Army National Guard end strength by only 5,000 instead of 15-35,000;
- keep 26 of the Army Guard’s brigade combat teams instead of 22;
- keep 8 of its aviation (helicopter) brigades instead of 22 and 6; and
- keep six of the Guard’s eight AH-64 Apache attack helicopter battalions, downsizing the other two to squadrons, instead of transferring ALL the Apaches to the active-duty Army.
NEW! The National Guard is willing to compromise, why isn't Active Duty Army? This is supposed to be a "Total Force," with the concept of "One Team, One Fight." Read a very valid proposal from the PAARNG, with input from the U.S. Army War College:
arng_alternative_aviation_restructure_initiative_ari.pptx |
There is a lot of information being thrown out there by senior Army Leadership, certain Pentagon Officials, and others, voicing their opinion as to why they think Active Duty (AD) should have ALL the AH-64 Apache Helicopters - known as the Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI). It's time to start fact checking these statements. This forum will be used to start capturing some of these allegations and addressing their validity.
UPDATED! Read the rebuttal to Deputy Secretary of Defense Christine Fox's brief - the slides below factually counter many of the myths propagated in the original presentation:
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MYTH VS. FACT?
MYTH VS. FACT?
rebuttal_to_deputy_secdef_foxs_brief_v5.pptx.pdf |
Myth or Fact? Guard units do not do as many collective training events as Active Duty.
Answer: Myth. Senior Aviation Leaders are honing in on the fact that the Guard Apache Battalions - known as Armed Reconnaissance Battalions (ARBs) - do not do as many rotations through NTC and JRTC (whose schedules, by the way, are driven by Active Duty). Guard aviators don't need to do as many rotations BECAUSE of their large base of experience. Many senior Guard Apache aviators already know what's being taught at NTC and JRTC because they've already done this training numerous times over the past 20 to 30 years. NTC and JRTC is really designed for new pilots, staff, and leaders, which AD is constantly going through, whereas RC is not. It goes back to continuity and decades of longevity in a unit - which the Guard clearly has, and Active Duty does not. The superior experience and continuity of the Guard allows the senior aviators to train and maintain decades of experience. Something that Active Duty obviously struggles with.
Guard ARBs also frequently train with other branches, such as the Fighter Weapon Schools at Nellis (USAF) or Fallon (USN) or MAWTS (USMC) - these locations are home to the elite of the Air Force, Navy, and Marines, and they frequently request to work with the Guard. Why doesn't the Army have a "Top Gun" school? The other services use these schools to combine and refine TTPs - something Active Duty is seriously lacking. The Guard also frequently trains with Special Forces from the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines. Most Guard units have additional unique training that goes above and beyond anything you will find on Active Duty, to include Shipboard & Overwater Operations (SC, NC) and High Mountain / Power Management (ID, UT, AZ) - the latter of which has paid dividends for the Guard in their missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, where the terrain is extremely challenging and hot temperatures with heavy aircraft result in minimal power margins.
Bottom Line: Guard ARBs spend more time planning and executing collective training as a result of fewer training distractors and concentrated training plans that AD simply cannot take advantage of. AD is frequently too distracted with, to quote a former Active Duty pilot, "Garrison Training... AC ARBs may return to what is was in the early '90s. Back then we did PT, Fun Runs, SDO... and [when flying] never left our Restricted Area. There is also probably a good chance that in the next 5-10 years a large portion of AC combat veteran pilots will choose to leave Active Duty for one reason or another. A good number of your most experienced AH-64 pilots will end up in the National Guard."
The larger issue here is the Senior Leadership of the Active Duty calling into question the experience, capability, reliability, and availability of the Guard. It is disgraceful, disingenuous, and some high ranking individuals on Active Duty should be truly ashamed of what they are saying.
Myth or Fact? Certain senior ranking Active Duty Army Officials have been unlawfully lobbying on their own service's behalf.
Answer: Fact. Active Duty has been aggressively and illegally lobbying Congress and the Senate, despite specific language in the omnibus spending bill passed in January that clearly forbids the practice. Unless called upon to testify before the House or the Senate, the Army has no authority to lobby or otherwise "sell" a plan to government officials and representatives. Read more on this in the file below.
ngaus_-_unlawful_maneuvers_by_active_duty.pdf |
army_end_strength_s_and_discussion_v1.pptx |
General Grass may be the Joint Chief of the National Guard, but as a Title 10 Officer, he ultimately must answer to Active Duty. The House and Senate needs to ask senior Title 32 Guard Officers, such as State Adjutant Generals (TAGs) and Senior Aviation Officers (SAOs), to present their facts and supporting information about the right answer for the National Guard Force Structure. And unfortunately, much of the press has been dominated by Active Duty - the Guard must be given equal voice.
Myth or Fact? According to Deputy Secretary of Defense Fox, National Guard attack helicopter units just can’t be as battle-ready as full-time regular Army ones.
Source: http://breakingdefense.com/2014/04/guard-apaches-less-ready-must-move-to-regular-army-depsecdef-fox-tells-hill/
Answer: Myth. National Guard attack helicopters units are just as "battle-ready" as Active Duty, and oftentimes more so. From 2003 to 2007, Guard ARBs from NC, UT, ID, & AZ rotated through Afghanistan, when there was only 1 BN for ALL of OEF - those Guard units had EVERY mission across the country and were in numerous fire fights. Of the 5 Battalions during this time frame, 4 were Guard and only 1 was Active Duty.
From 2012 to 2014, UT, PA, & MO Guard ARBs were given the task of nightly direct support to Tier 1 Special Operations, including numerous fire fights and HVT kinetic strikes in some of the most challenging terrain in the country. A majority of these were done by the Guard, with no Apache Class A, "pilot-error" accidents.
Furthermore, one of the former Director's of DES claims that AD had to teach the Guard not to hover in OEF/OIF, which is interesting considering that Active Duty made the biggest mistake of hovering in combat, at the Karbala Gap, in which 30+ Apaches suffered substantial battle damage, and one of the aircraft was shot down. In contrast, the Guard is home to many former AH-1 Cobra pilots who have long known that hovering is not a viable tactic against an insurgency.
Check out:
http://madmax.lmtonline.com/textarchives/032304/s5.htm
or:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_Attack_on_Karbala
More often than not, it was Guard Apache pilots teaching Active Duty, not the other way around. During the OEF RIPs, the incoming Active Duty aviators struggled to learn the concepts from the Guard and were barely able to take over the mission prior to Guard ARBs leaving country. The majority of the AD aviators are very inexperienced in comparison and had a difficult time picking up the required skills. Many Active Duty SPs and "experienced" pilots required extensive training to assume the OEF mission and underwent what is known as "RIP Shock." As a result, some AD ARBs had trouble with timely and effective OEF TIC support and air-ground integration and requested help from the outgoing Guard ARBs.
One more salient point... Guard ARBs have been setting flight records in combat, meaning flying more than many AC units. Credit goes to the superior Guard mechanics who take pride in their maintenance and don't rely on contract maintenance - with an end result of better maintenance and management of Guard Apaches. And equal credit goes to Guard aviators and leaders who have gone above and beyond the call of duty to support and protect our U.S. military and allies in combat. The missions that AC would turn down - of which there were many - the Guard would pick up. And the Guard did them safely and effectively.
Myth or Fact? General Odierno recently stated that the lack of time for future training needed to master the complexity of air-ground integration for Guard pilots influenced the decision [in favor of Active Duty].
Source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/congress-and-pentagon-are-engaged-in-a-new-fight-where-do-apache-helicopters-belong/2014/04/07/205f8a80-b84b-11e3-9a05-c739f29ccb08_story.html
Answer: Myth. Guard pilots have just as much, and in many cases more, experience in air-ground integration. Guard units consistently train with units in State, and frequently, out of State in national and even multi-national level exercises. And what the Guard has, that Active Duty doesn't, is continuity. So even if AD attempts to regularly train their pilots, their turn over rate is so much higher that this training is lost as aviators either retire or join the Guard.
Does Active Duty really fly more than the Guard? Given the authorized annual flight hours given to Active Duty versus the Guard, this argument could be made - after all, these hours are determined by Active Duty. But what really needs to be added to this is the understanding that Active Duty requires more flight hours and more training, because of their high turn over rate. AD is costing tax payers more money, not less. The Guard offers more diversity, experience, and ultimately more effective operational execution, for less money.
Myth or Fact? Active Duty has crashed over a dozen Apaches - known as "Class A" accidents - in the last 5 year due to pilot error.
Answer: Fact. And in that same time frame, the National Guard & Reserves have lost one to pilot error. At $30 million an Apache, this is a nearly a half billion lost by Active Duty. But it isn't just about money - it's about who is better at managing their assets. There is clearly a direct correlation between accidents and experience. With NO losses due to pilot error, the answer to this is overwhelmingly in favor of the Guard. Guard aviators have, on average, significantly more experience than Active Duty aviators.
Myth or Fact? House Resolution (H.R.) 3930, if approved, would only apply to the Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI).
Answer: Myth. If H.R. 3930 is approved, not only does it halt any transfer of aircraft from the Guard to Active Duty for 2 years, it also enacts a temporary freeze to reduction of Guard personnel - keeping the total, at least temporarily, at 350,000.
From pre-decisional working papers released by NGB, it has been discovered that the Active Duty is looking to reduce the Guard to 315,000 soldiers, which equates to a loss of ~20 Brigades. If approved, this results in staggering losses in Guard manning in several states, such as Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Indiana, Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington. Many of those states risk losing approximately 1,200 soldiers. Regardless, EVERY State will lose personnel in the current plans being proposed.
If H.R. 3930 passes through the House and Senate, it would also authorize a study, so that an informed decision could be made by an unbiased, third party, after all the facts were carefully analyzed and options weighed.
Learn more @ http://www.ngaus.org/issues-advocacy/take-action (NGAUS Alert #14-2).
Myth or Fact? General Grass of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) caved in to pressure from Active Duty.
Answer: This one is hard to say... General Grass was previously working toward a compromise between the Guard and Active Duty on the issue of keeping Apaches in the Guard, but very recently changed his official stance. Given that General Grass and most of NGB is Title 10, it's not hard to imagine that he and the rest of NGB were effectively told to "toe the party line." Read more @ http://www.politico.com/story/2014/04/army-guard-lobbying-war-for-the-apache-105545.html
General Grass did have this to say about the commission being recommended by H.R. 3930, "As we look to 2023, and with the fiscal realities we’re facing... who would not want an independent look? This committee, that’s going to have to help us through this, I would think you would want an independent look, as well.”
Myth or Fact? Soldiers assigned to work for National Guard Bureau are Title 10 as opposed to Title 32.
Answer: Fact. This raises the obvious issue of conflict of interest, and here's why... Title 10 means the soldier is funded by Active Duty, and therefore must, in the end, answer directly to - and is evaluated by - Active Duty. How can a soldier best represent the Guard in this capacity? Even if the soldier is trying to represent the Guard, his or her career is under the influence of the Active Duty chain of command. The solution to this issue? All NGB soldiers should be Title 32, meaning funded and evaluated by the Guard, and responsible to the Guard alone.
A little known fact is that General Grass' name is not even included on the Joint Chief of Staff letterhead. Apparently this position is not taken seriously enough to include the Chief of the National Guard.
Myth or Fact? To paraphrase an Armed Services staffer, "While it is true that Army Guard units have, on paper, significantly reduced the amount of pre-mob training needed before a combat deployment, what's not being reflected is the added number of MUTA and AT days that are being performed in order to make up for the reduced pre-mob training. So, if you take those extra training days into consideration that the spin-up time for a typical Army Guard unit has not really decreased, thus making them just as expensive, if not more so, than their AD counterparts."
Answer: Myth. Unless deployed, the Guard absolutely costs less than Active Duty. The average aviator is paid by the Guard between 90 to 120 days a year - for all things, including drill, A.T., and flying on AFTPs - this is clearly one-third the cost. And unlike AD, the Guard does not receive TRICARE or Housing Allowance unless serving on extended orders. And most Guard aviators receive only a fraction of flight pay Active Duty aviators do. It is ridiculous for anyone to say that the Guard costs more.
Myth or Fact? General Odierno recently told the Senate Armed Services Committee, "Of the 798 total aircraft reduced under this plan, 687 aircraft or 86% will come out of the active component and 111 aircraft or 14% from the National Guard. We will also transfer about 100 UH-60s to the Guard."
Source: http://www.army.mil/article/123234/
Answer: Myth. Nearly half of the UH-60s Blackhawks Odierno refers to were already given to the Guard - Active Duty is giving us nothing for the 192 Apaches they plan to take. Furthermore, if the Guard loses the Apache, Guard Blackhawks will have to be reshuffled amongst all the States, which will possibly result in States not having Apaches to have to give up some of their Blackhawks to those that do.
Another myth... the Guard is not at risk of losing 111 aircraft. It is at risk of losing 192 AH-64 Apaches and 30 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopters. And that's if Active Duty elects not to take any of the Guard UH-72 Lakotas. Net loss for the Guard? 222 helicopters. That is a staggering percentage of the total airframes the Guard currently possesses.
Myth or Fact? In the same statement, Odierno added, "As with end strength, we are disproportionately taking cuts from the active component aviation and in fact we will eliminate three full combat aviation brigades out of the Active component, while the National Guard sustains all of its brigade structure."
Answer: Myth. The truly disproportionate cut is against the Guard. If the Guard loses its Apache helicopters, then the Guard no longer has ANY Combat Aviation Brigades. For in order to be a Combat Aviation Brigade, it must have combat assets, i.e. Apaches. And the Guard would not sustain its brigade structure - it would be a fundamental shift of it structure. The loss of all Apache helicopters would effectively neuter the Guard, making the Guard more of a Domestic Response, stripping it of its essential role as an Operational and Strategic asset.
Myth or Fact? In a recent publication by News360, the authors argue that, "The Army’s decision to transfer respective elements of its aviation fleet to the Guard, reserve, and active-duty forces makes the most effective and efficient use of taxpayer dollars while best preserving their respective roles and missions. Congress should support a swift transfer of these assets. Any additional commissions, studies, or reports would only delay the Army’s ability to provide the right balance of capabilities."
Source: http://news360.com/article/232831618
Answer: Myth. Transferring Apaches from the Reserve Component to Active Duty would be a detrimental loss of 40% of the total trained Apache force. And in that 40% are, on average, the most experience aviators and mechanics. A 40% cut in the total trained force would lead to an extremely large gap in readiness, and substantially increase the vulnerability of Army Aviation substantially.
An additional commission is in order to gather the facts and allow an independent, unbiased party to analyze the information and make an informed decision. The Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI), if approved, will result in sweeping changes across Active Duty, Guard, & Reserves. Such a large decision - and an irreversible one - should not be made until the implications and consequences are very carefully considered.
Myth or Fact? In the same publication, the authors contest, "Best Value for the Taxpayer, Best Support to National Security: The U.S. Army and Army National Guard each have critical roles to play in defending the country against threats, protecting U.S. interests at home and abroad, and serving the American public. Both components do this best in their respective spheres of responsibility. The current plan to realign aviation assets is wholly consistent with these considerations."
Answer: Myth. Is is not in best value of the taxpayer, nor is it in the best interest of National Security. Is the nation really willing to dismantle Guard Apache Battalions and throw away over a third of the aviators and maintainers who are the most experienced [and least costly] in the US Army? The Army would actually INCREASE its vulnerability by doing so. It will take YEARS [as in 15 to 20, or more] to train a replacement force for this loss of senior aviators and maintainers.
Furthermore, it is imperative to understand that the Guard has two roles it must fulfill: one is to provide a ready reserve to the Nation's military – meaning the ability to supplement Active Duty in any mission, anywhere in the world; the other is to assist the State when requested by the Governor.
Myth or Fact? Active Duty faces an approximate 26.5% cut of its force.
Answer: Myth. Senior Active Duty Leaders claim that Active Duty is at risk of being cut from its approved surge level of 570,000 soldiers to 420,000 soldiers - which would be an approximate 26.5% cut. Active Duty never reached 570,000, but instead peaked at about 540,000 soldiers at the height of the surge in 2010. That's a ~22% cut.
What's not being acknowledged by Active Duty is the fact that their "cuts" are being compared to the "Grow the Army" baseline, a model that was temporarily approved in the support of the buildup following 9/11. The "Grow the Army" model was never meant to extend beyond OEF/OIF. And yet, AD is using this as their justification that they face significantly more cuts than the Guard. This little known fact has been hidden from the public and is how AD is justifying their claims.
Here are the real numbers to keep in mind... using the pre 9/11 force totals, Active Duty faces a modest 12.85% reduction (from 482,000 to 420,000); the Guard faces a 10% reduction (from 350,000 to 315,000). The rumor is that General John Rossi will be visiting all 50 Governors to pitch the Active Duty plan. It is important to understand the truth behind the percentages. Be informed! To learn more about General Rossi and his stance on the ARI, check out: http://breakingdefense.com/2014/03/national-guard-commanders-rise-in-revolt-against-active-army-mg-ross-questions-guard-combat-role/
Below are two .ppts that provide more insight into the often misleading information being presented by Active Duty. Take the time to read the comments section of the second file to see understand what's true and what isn't.
Myth or Fact? According to Deputy Secretary of Defense Fox, National Guard attack helicopter units just can’t be as battle-ready as full-time regular Army ones.
Source: http://breakingdefense.com/2014/04/guard-apaches-less-ready-must-move-to-regular-army-depsecdef-fox-tells-hill/
Answer: Myth. National Guard attack helicopters units are just as "battle-ready" as Active Duty, and oftentimes more so. From 2003 to 2007, Guard ARBs from NC, UT, ID, & AZ rotated through Afghanistan, when there was only 1 BN for ALL of OEF - those Guard units had EVERY mission across the country and were in numerous fire fights. Of the 5 Battalions during this time frame, 4 were Guard and only 1 was Active Duty.
From 2012 to 2014, UT, PA, & MO Guard ARBs were given the task of nightly direct support to Tier 1 Special Operations, including numerous fire fights and HVT kinetic strikes in some of the most challenging terrain in the country. A majority of these were done by the Guard, with no Apache Class A, "pilot-error" accidents.
Furthermore, one of the former Director's of DES claims that AD had to teach the Guard not to hover in OEF/OIF, which is interesting considering that Active Duty made the biggest mistake of hovering in combat, at the Karbala Gap, in which 30+ Apaches suffered substantial battle damage, and one of the aircraft was shot down. In contrast, the Guard is home to many former AH-1 Cobra pilots who have long known that hovering is not a viable tactic against an insurgency.
Check out:
http://madmax.lmtonline.com/textarchives/032304/s5.htm
or:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_Attack_on_Karbala
More often than not, it was Guard Apache pilots teaching Active Duty, not the other way around. During the OEF RIPs, the incoming Active Duty aviators struggled to learn the concepts from the Guard and were barely able to take over the mission prior to Guard ARBs leaving country. The majority of the AD aviators are very inexperienced in comparison and had a difficult time picking up the required skills. Many Active Duty SPs and "experienced" pilots required extensive training to assume the OEF mission and underwent what is known as "RIP Shock." As a result, some AD ARBs had trouble with timely and effective OEF TIC support and air-ground integration and requested help from the outgoing Guard ARBs.
One more salient point... Guard ARBs have been setting flight records in combat, meaning flying more than many AC units. Credit goes to the superior Guard mechanics who take pride in their maintenance and don't rely on contract maintenance - with an end result of better maintenance and management of Guard Apaches. And equal credit goes to Guard aviators and leaders who have gone above and beyond the call of duty to support and protect our U.S. military and allies in combat. The missions that AC would turn down - of which there were many - the Guard would pick up. And the Guard did them safely and effectively.
Myth or Fact? General Odierno recently stated that the lack of time for future training needed to master the complexity of air-ground integration for Guard pilots influenced the decision [in favor of Active Duty].
Source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/congress-and-pentagon-are-engaged-in-a-new-fight-where-do-apache-helicopters-belong/2014/04/07/205f8a80-b84b-11e3-9a05-c739f29ccb08_story.html
Answer: Myth. Guard pilots have just as much, and in many cases more, experience in air-ground integration. Guard units consistently train with units in State, and frequently, out of State in national and even multi-national level exercises. And what the Guard has, that Active Duty doesn't, is continuity. So even if AD attempts to regularly train their pilots, their turn over rate is so much higher that this training is lost as aviators either retire or join the Guard.
Does Active Duty really fly more than the Guard? Given the authorized annual flight hours given to Active Duty versus the Guard, this argument could be made - after all, these hours are determined by Active Duty. But what really needs to be added to this is the understanding that Active Duty requires more flight hours and more training, because of their high turn over rate. AD is costing tax payers more money, not less. The Guard offers more diversity, experience, and ultimately more effective operational execution, for less money.
Myth or Fact? Active Duty has crashed over a dozen Apaches - known as "Class A" accidents - in the last 5 year due to pilot error.
Answer: Fact. And in that same time frame, the National Guard & Reserves have lost one to pilot error. At $30 million an Apache, this is a nearly a half billion lost by Active Duty. But it isn't just about money - it's about who is better at managing their assets. There is clearly a direct correlation between accidents and experience. With NO losses due to pilot error, the answer to this is overwhelmingly in favor of the Guard. Guard aviators have, on average, significantly more experience than Active Duty aviators.
Myth or Fact? House Resolution (H.R.) 3930, if approved, would only apply to the Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI).
Answer: Myth. If H.R. 3930 is approved, not only does it halt any transfer of aircraft from the Guard to Active Duty for 2 years, it also enacts a temporary freeze to reduction of Guard personnel - keeping the total, at least temporarily, at 350,000.
From pre-decisional working papers released by NGB, it has been discovered that the Active Duty is looking to reduce the Guard to 315,000 soldiers, which equates to a loss of ~20 Brigades. If approved, this results in staggering losses in Guard manning in several states, such as Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Indiana, Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington. Many of those states risk losing approximately 1,200 soldiers. Regardless, EVERY State will lose personnel in the current plans being proposed.
If H.R. 3930 passes through the House and Senate, it would also authorize a study, so that an informed decision could be made by an unbiased, third party, after all the facts were carefully analyzed and options weighed.
Learn more @ http://www.ngaus.org/issues-advocacy/take-action (NGAUS Alert #14-2).
Myth or Fact? General Grass of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) caved in to pressure from Active Duty.
Answer: This one is hard to say... General Grass was previously working toward a compromise between the Guard and Active Duty on the issue of keeping Apaches in the Guard, but very recently changed his official stance. Given that General Grass and most of NGB is Title 10, it's not hard to imagine that he and the rest of NGB were effectively told to "toe the party line." Read more @ http://www.politico.com/story/2014/04/army-guard-lobbying-war-for-the-apache-105545.html
General Grass did have this to say about the commission being recommended by H.R. 3930, "As we look to 2023, and with the fiscal realities we’re facing... who would not want an independent look? This committee, that’s going to have to help us through this, I would think you would want an independent look, as well.”
Myth or Fact? Soldiers assigned to work for National Guard Bureau are Title 10 as opposed to Title 32.
Answer: Fact. This raises the obvious issue of conflict of interest, and here's why... Title 10 means the soldier is funded by Active Duty, and therefore must, in the end, answer directly to - and is evaluated by - Active Duty. How can a soldier best represent the Guard in this capacity? Even if the soldier is trying to represent the Guard, his or her career is under the influence of the Active Duty chain of command. The solution to this issue? All NGB soldiers should be Title 32, meaning funded and evaluated by the Guard, and responsible to the Guard alone.
A little known fact is that General Grass' name is not even included on the Joint Chief of Staff letterhead. Apparently this position is not taken seriously enough to include the Chief of the National Guard.
Myth or Fact? To paraphrase an Armed Services staffer, "While it is true that Army Guard units have, on paper, significantly reduced the amount of pre-mob training needed before a combat deployment, what's not being reflected is the added number of MUTA and AT days that are being performed in order to make up for the reduced pre-mob training. So, if you take those extra training days into consideration that the spin-up time for a typical Army Guard unit has not really decreased, thus making them just as expensive, if not more so, than their AD counterparts."
Answer: Myth. Unless deployed, the Guard absolutely costs less than Active Duty. The average aviator is paid by the Guard between 90 to 120 days a year - for all things, including drill, A.T., and flying on AFTPs - this is clearly one-third the cost. And unlike AD, the Guard does not receive TRICARE or Housing Allowance unless serving on extended orders. And most Guard aviators receive only a fraction of flight pay Active Duty aviators do. It is ridiculous for anyone to say that the Guard costs more.
Myth or Fact? General Odierno recently told the Senate Armed Services Committee, "Of the 798 total aircraft reduced under this plan, 687 aircraft or 86% will come out of the active component and 111 aircraft or 14% from the National Guard. We will also transfer about 100 UH-60s to the Guard."
Source: http://www.army.mil/article/123234/
Answer: Myth. Nearly half of the UH-60s Blackhawks Odierno refers to were already given to the Guard - Active Duty is giving us nothing for the 192 Apaches they plan to take. Furthermore, if the Guard loses the Apache, Guard Blackhawks will have to be reshuffled amongst all the States, which will possibly result in States not having Apaches to have to give up some of their Blackhawks to those that do.
Another myth... the Guard is not at risk of losing 111 aircraft. It is at risk of losing 192 AH-64 Apaches and 30 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopters. And that's if Active Duty elects not to take any of the Guard UH-72 Lakotas. Net loss for the Guard? 222 helicopters. That is a staggering percentage of the total airframes the Guard currently possesses.
Myth or Fact? In the same statement, Odierno added, "As with end strength, we are disproportionately taking cuts from the active component aviation and in fact we will eliminate three full combat aviation brigades out of the Active component, while the National Guard sustains all of its brigade structure."
Answer: Myth. The truly disproportionate cut is against the Guard. If the Guard loses its Apache helicopters, then the Guard no longer has ANY Combat Aviation Brigades. For in order to be a Combat Aviation Brigade, it must have combat assets, i.e. Apaches. And the Guard would not sustain its brigade structure - it would be a fundamental shift of it structure. The loss of all Apache helicopters would effectively neuter the Guard, making the Guard more of a Domestic Response, stripping it of its essential role as an Operational and Strategic asset.
Myth or Fact? In a recent publication by News360, the authors argue that, "The Army’s decision to transfer respective elements of its aviation fleet to the Guard, reserve, and active-duty forces makes the most effective and efficient use of taxpayer dollars while best preserving their respective roles and missions. Congress should support a swift transfer of these assets. Any additional commissions, studies, or reports would only delay the Army’s ability to provide the right balance of capabilities."
Source: http://news360.com/article/232831618
Answer: Myth. Transferring Apaches from the Reserve Component to Active Duty would be a detrimental loss of 40% of the total trained Apache force. And in that 40% are, on average, the most experience aviators and mechanics. A 40% cut in the total trained force would lead to an extremely large gap in readiness, and substantially increase the vulnerability of Army Aviation substantially.
An additional commission is in order to gather the facts and allow an independent, unbiased party to analyze the information and make an informed decision. The Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI), if approved, will result in sweeping changes across Active Duty, Guard, & Reserves. Such a large decision - and an irreversible one - should not be made until the implications and consequences are very carefully considered.
Myth or Fact? In the same publication, the authors contest, "Best Value for the Taxpayer, Best Support to National Security: The U.S. Army and Army National Guard each have critical roles to play in defending the country against threats, protecting U.S. interests at home and abroad, and serving the American public. Both components do this best in their respective spheres of responsibility. The current plan to realign aviation assets is wholly consistent with these considerations."
Answer: Myth. Is is not in best value of the taxpayer, nor is it in the best interest of National Security. Is the nation really willing to dismantle Guard Apache Battalions and throw away over a third of the aviators and maintainers who are the most experienced [and least costly] in the US Army? The Army would actually INCREASE its vulnerability by doing so. It will take YEARS [as in 15 to 20, or more] to train a replacement force for this loss of senior aviators and maintainers.
Furthermore, it is imperative to understand that the Guard has two roles it must fulfill: one is to provide a ready reserve to the Nation's military – meaning the ability to supplement Active Duty in any mission, anywhere in the world; the other is to assist the State when requested by the Governor.
Myth or Fact? Active Duty faces an approximate 26.5% cut of its force.
Answer: Myth. Senior Active Duty Leaders claim that Active Duty is at risk of being cut from its approved surge level of 570,000 soldiers to 420,000 soldiers - which would be an approximate 26.5% cut. Active Duty never reached 570,000, but instead peaked at about 540,000 soldiers at the height of the surge in 2010. That's a ~22% cut.
What's not being acknowledged by Active Duty is the fact that their "cuts" are being compared to the "Grow the Army" baseline, a model that was temporarily approved in the support of the buildup following 9/11. The "Grow the Army" model was never meant to extend beyond OEF/OIF. And yet, AD is using this as their justification that they face significantly more cuts than the Guard. This little known fact has been hidden from the public and is how AD is justifying their claims.
Here are the real numbers to keep in mind... using the pre 9/11 force totals, Active Duty faces a modest 12.85% reduction (from 482,000 to 420,000); the Guard faces a 10% reduction (from 350,000 to 315,000). The rumor is that General John Rossi will be visiting all 50 Governors to pitch the Active Duty plan. It is important to understand the truth behind the percentages. Be informed! To learn more about General Rossi and his stance on the ARI, check out: http://breakingdefense.com/2014/03/national-guard-commanders-rise-in-revolt-against-active-army-mg-ross-questions-guard-combat-role/
Below are two .ppts that provide more insight into the often misleading information being presented by Active Duty. Take the time to read the comments section of the second file to see understand what's true and what isn't.
extract_of_total_army_force_mix_-_rebuttal.pptx |
Myth or Fact? Other nations are reducing their Active Component and increasing their Reserve Component to save money but maintain (or build) their force structure.
Answer: In many instances, this is true. This was discussed recently in some joint, multinational conferences. Many European Nations, such as the British and the Dutch, are doing just that. Perhaps there is a lesson or two to be learned from our allies?