



Rejected NGB Proposal

Current NG Force Structure = 352K

NGB BCA

Army BCA

335K

Reduced Force Structure

315K

Focus: Readiness

345K

End Strength

315K

Focus: Cost Alone

26

Brigade Combat Teams

22

8

Combat Aviation Brig.

6

6 Attack Aviation
Battalions 0

• End state is an avg. 8.8% FSA reduction

• Increases risk to nation's needs

- Readiness reduced with similar impact to AC
- Gross turbulence: 17,723 spaces
- Unprogrammed turbulence cost: \$265 million
- End state is an avg. 3% FSA reduction
- Reduces risk to meet nation's needs

- Rebalanced capabilities will require > 5 yrs to regain readiness

- Gross turbulence: 55,000 spaces
- Unprogrammed turbulence cost: \$1.07B

Reduces 4,000 AGRs (28,810 to 24,810)

Reduces 1,284 MILTECHs (27,210 to 25,926)

Total: 5,284 fulltime

\$1.7 Billion Decrease
\$16.2B reduction To \$14.5B (BCA)

Reduces 2,927 AGRs (28,810 to 25,883)

Reduces 2,814 MILTECHs (27,210 to 24,396)

Total: 5,741 fulltime



National Guard Myths vs. Facts

MYTH: The National Guard plan lowers readiness and converts the force into a “strategic reserve”.

FACT: The National Guard Plan incorporates a system of progressive readiness based on the ARFORGEN cycle that provides ready units as needed, a fiscally responsible choice that retains capability and promotes efficiency. The Army’s plan relegates the Guard to a “strategic reserve” by removing combat arms force structure and creating a 2nd class force.

MYTH: It takes 2 years to mobilize a National Guard unit.

FACT: Capabilities are mobilized when needed. Predictability allows for precision in preparing units. Most Guard units are available within 45 days. Our most complex organizations mobilize in 60-100 days. Guard units will be ready before the Army can deploy the majority of its forces, due to airlift and sealift limitations.

MYTH: The National Guard is inaccessible.

FACT: Congress has provided a full range of emergency and non-emergency activation authorities. The National Guard has mobilized more than 700,000 troops in the past 12 years and remains ready to meet every request.

MYTH: National Guard members are “Weekend Warriors”.

FACT: Since the 1990’s the National Guard has been a globally deployable operational force capable of simultaneously executing combat operations overseas and emergency response at home. Guard members have invaluable civilian skills that are routinely put to use on the battlefield and are not prevalent among active Army personnel.

MYTH: National Guard members train 39 days a year.

FACT: 39 days is the minimum. The current average is 94.2 training days (includes AGR, ADOS and all training categories)

MYTH: The only valuable training is Army training. It’s the only training that contributes to readiness.

FACT: Guardsmen also benefit from a vast array of training, education, and work experience gained in the private and public sector at no cost to the military. This experience has been invaluable to America’s military success at home and overseas.

MYTH: The National Guard cannot effectively operate above company level.

FACT: Several National Guard Brigades and Battalions routinely execute collective operations above company level during emergency response, combat, and training exercises.

MYTH: The National Guard is a complimentary force and is not interchangeable with active Army units

FACT: The National Guard has the same force structure, equipment, and training requirements as the active Army and systematically moves through a progressive readiness cycle prior to deployment.



FY15 Army Budget Request: Proportional Reduction?

FY 15 Budget Request

\$\$\$ in Thousands

Operations & Maintenance Funding						
	FY 14 Base Enacted		FY 15 Request			
			Growth		% of FY 14	
Army	\$	30,643,894	\$	33,240,149	\$ 2,596,255	8%
Navy	\$	35,843,728	\$	39,316,857	\$ 3,473,129	10%
USAF	\$	33,117,642	\$	35,331,193	\$ 2,213,551	7%
USMC	\$	5,389,568	\$	5,909,487	\$ 519,919	10%
AC	\$	104,994,832	\$	113,797,686	\$ 8,802,854	8%
USAR	\$	2,940,936	\$	2,490,569	\$ (450,367)	-15%
USNR	\$	1,158,382	\$	1,007,100	\$ (151,282)	-13%
ARNG	\$	6,857,530	\$	6,030,773	\$ (826,757)	-12%
USAFR	\$	3,062,207	\$	3,015,842	\$ (46,365)	-2%
ANG	\$	6,392,304	\$	6,392,859	\$ 555	0%
USMCR	\$	255,317	\$	268,582	\$ 13,265	5%
RC	\$	20,666,676	\$	19,205,725	\$ (1,460,951)	-7%
Def-Wide	\$	64,828,110	\$	64,196,686	\$ (631,424)	-1%
DoD Total	\$	195,102,841	\$	199,140,253	\$ 4,037,412	2%


Source: http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2015/fy2015_o1.pdf

Military Personnel Funding						
	FY 14 Base Enacted		FY 15 Request			
Army	\$	42,714,992	\$	43,020,663	\$ 305,671	1%
Navy		28500034	\$	28,670,201	\$ 170,167	1%
USAF	\$	29,778,645	\$	28,962,036	\$ (816,609)	-3%
USMC	\$	13,494,831	\$	13,591,802	\$ 96,971	1%
AC	\$	114,488,502	\$	114,244,702	\$ (243,800)	0%
USAR	\$	4,848,570	\$	4,809,268	\$ (39,302)	-1%
USNR		1991778	\$	1,973,603	\$ (18,175)	-1%
ARNG	\$	8,595,073	\$	8,293,670	\$ (301,403)	-4%
USAFR	\$	1,879,246	\$	1,788,069	\$ (91,177)	-5%
ANG	\$	3,364,171	\$	3,348,449	\$ (15,722)	0%
USMCR	\$	744,217	\$	735,924	\$ (8,293)	-1%
RC	\$	21,423,055	\$	20,948,983	\$ (474,072)	-2%

SOURCE: http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2015/fy2015_m1.pdf



Army BCA Effects on the 54 National Guards at a 315K Total Guard Force





Reminder

- The following slide must be customized by each state to highlight the effects of the Army's Budget Proposal.
- Delete this reminder slide.




Effects on the [*Your State's*] National Guard

- Reduction of ARNG to 335K will equate to:
 - Loss of XXXX+ positions
 - Loss of XXXX+ full-time employees
 - Loss of XXXX helicopters
 - Loss of XXXXX+ vehicles/equipment



- Reduction of ARNG to 315K will equate to:
 - Loss of XXXXX+ positions
 - Loss of XXX+ full-time employees
 - Loss of XXX helicopters
 - Loss of XXX+ vehicles/equipment



- Either plan will result in the loss of key assets to respond to Louisiana domestic emergencies
 - Loss of Command and Control assets
 - Loss of Search and Rescue airframes
 - Decreased Commodity Distribution capabilities
 - Inability to support State-wide communications
 - Reduced capacity to provide Road Clearing and Engineering support
 - Decreased capability to support Local Law Enforcement